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 1 Introduction 
 This chapter is about how you will forget this chapter. It’s about what 
forgetting anything is. We forget often, and psychologists research why. 
But neither they nor philosophers have tried much to unearth the  nature of 
forgetting. The little shoveling in the area has turned topsoil only. 
 This is odd, since forgetting is philosophically important. It looks essentially 
connected to, and as important as,  remembering —a popular topic in the 
philosophy of memory. Fifty years ago, the  Philosophical Review published 
C.B. Martin and Max Deutscher’s landmark article “Remembering,” which 
proposed an analysis of remembering. The literature on their paper and 
topic is now sizable. Commonsense puts remembering on one pole of a 
spectrum, and forgetting on the opposite pole. If commonsense is correct 
here, then a handle on forgetting looks crucial to a handle on remembering. 
We fully grip the poles together or not at all. Yet “forget” appears only three 
times in Martin and Deutscher’s paper. 
 Forgetting also matters in epistemology. The fact that ordinary humans 
forget introduces an evaluative challenge. We forget evidence, as well as 
counterevidence or “defeaters.” This forgetting can be a kind of losing. 
But losing evidence or counterevidence can affect what it is reasonable to 
believe. Since epistemology is concerned with theories of reasonable belief, 
understanding what counts as forgetting will be crucial to evaluating these 
theories. 1 Without this understanding, it will be hard to tell whether an 
apparent case involving forgetting is a counterexample to a theory. 
 What’s more, the pattern of ordinary human forgetting looks epistemically 
signifi cant. Kourken  Michaelian (2011 : 400) argues that, contrary to a 
standard view in epistemology, normal human forgetting “approximates a 
virtue” rather than a vice. It is a mean between too much forgetting and 
too much remembering. If Michaelian or the standard view is right, then 
forgetting underlies a normative epistemic status. 
 Forgetting has no small signifi cance in metaphysics either. Consider 
personal identity, that is, how a person persists or is identical to something 
at another time. One take on this is that personal identity consists in having 
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certain memory connections. 2 And forgetting looks like a wearing down of 
memory connections. Too much forgetting might destroy personal identity, 
on some theories. Testing these theories requires clarity on when subjects do 
and don’t forget. 
 There are other areas in philosophy where forgetting matters, but turn 
now to psychology. Most often, when psychologists talk of forgetting, 
they talk about its causes, not its nature. Research focuses on the trauma, 
disorders, and commonplace memory processing that makes forgetting 
more likely, not on what forgetting is. When psychologists do say what 
forgetting is, their accounts are often incomplete and superfi cially in-
compatible with one another. Further refl ection on forgetting will help 
reveal whether they really disagree with each other, whether they have 
ultimately distinct phenomena in mind, and whether some accounts are 
simply mistaken. 
 For reasons like these, I develop and defend a theory of forgetting in 
this chapter. First, I survey some viable choice-points for theorizing about 
forgetting, points where forgetting is somewhat murky. Then I state the 
theories of forgetting that fl it in the literature. I introduce two tests for a 
theory of forgetting, and show that the best theories from the literature fail 
both tests. Finally, I introduce a new theory of forgetting, the  le arning,  a c-
cess failure,  d ispositional (LEAD) theory. I argue that the LEAD Theory of 
Forgetting is the lead theory of forgetting. The causes and normative status 
of forgetting don’t get further airtime. 
 2 Dimensions of Forgetting 
 The dimensions of forgetting I will cover are notable, but not exhaustive. 
Keeping them in mind helps us articulate a more exact theory of forgetting. It 
turns out that what we say about some dimensions of forgetting limits what 
we can sensibly say about others. As we’ll see, that introduces problems for 
some theories of forgetting. Some dimensions to consider are: 
 Ontological Category 
 At a most general level, what kind of thing is forgetting? Maybe forgetting 
is a  mental state —a state of mind. It is something that a subject is in at a 
time, like the state of being in pain, or feeling bliss, or desiring the truth. 
Another option is that forgetting is a  mental process . It is something mental 
that unfolds over time, like the process of calculating a sum, or forgiving 
someone, or coming up with a joke. Some ordinary forgetting-attributions 
mask these options. When I tell you merely that “Maria is forgetting her 
password,” I may be saying something about her current mindset, or instead 
about how she is changing. It could be that these options aren’t exclusive. 
Some forgetting may be a state, and some may be a process. Within any of 
its dimensions, forgetting may show some diversity. 
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 Content 
 Set aside what forgetting itself is. What kind of thing is it that we forget? 
The content of forgetting could be  propositional . To forget is to forget that 
 p . Your friend forgets that Plato taught Aristotle, and you are forgetting 
that Tuesday is your mother’s birthday. Or the content of forgetting could 
be  objectual . To forget is to forget  o , where  o is an event, experience, or 
other object; I have forgotten my fi rst birthday party, and I am forgetting 
my childhood neighbor. Or, the content of forgetting could be  procedural . 
To forget is roughly to forget how to φ, where φ-ing is the performing of an 
action. The unfortunate magician forgets how to perform his magic trick, 
and the hungry fi sher is forgetting how to fi llet a fi sh. Different memory sys-
tems would naturally correspond to forgetting with different content types. 
Propositional forgetting would likely have a special relation to semantic 
memory, that is, memory for propositions; objectual forgetting would likely 
have a special relation to episodic memory, our memory for experienced 
events; and procedural forgetting would have a special relation to proce-
dural memory, our memory for how to do things and for skills. If some 
forgetting has one type of content and other forgetting has another type, 
more than one memory system is likely responsible for human forgetting. 3 
 Relation to Content 
 Forgetting appears to be a mental relation between a subject and a content. 
But a subject can bear many mental relations to a content. Suppose the 
content is propositional. A subject forgets that  p is related to  p in a certain 
way. What distinguishes that relation from others the subject bears to  p ? 
Instead of forgetting that  p a subject may, say, desire that  p or imagine 
that  p . Something characterizes forgetting, setting it apart from these other 
relations. Perhaps  loss characterizes it. To forget is, in some sense, to have 
something no longer. What exactly is lost is a further question.  Michaelian 
(2011 : 403) says a “record” or mental representation is lost, and others 
(e.g.,  McGrath, 2007 , p. 1;  Naylor, 2015 , p. 377) suggest a belief is lost. 
Another characterization of the forgetting relation is that of  failing to retrieve 
( Arango-Muñoz, 2013 ). Forgetting is not a matter of losing something, but 
rather of failing to access it. 
 Some relation characterizes forgetting. Whatever it is, another question 
concerns its minimal duration: how long must the relation endure to count 
as forgetting rather than as something else? The minimum may be short, 
such that even  temporary loss or retrieval failure could count as forget-
ting. Alternatively, the relation may have to be effectively  permanent . If 
something is forgotten it is locked away in, or eliminated from, the mind. It 
would have to be relearned altogether in order to be mentally accessed. Some 
philosophers (e.g.,  Pappas, 1987 , p. 153) think there is more than one kind 
of forgetting, and they individuate the kinds by minimal relation duration. 
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When the relation is permanent, it is one circumstance in which we hear the 
subject described as “completely” forgetting. 
 Scale 
 The last dimension I’ll cover is the magnitude-range of forgetting. Can for-
getting vary in intensity? The simplest answer is that it cannot. Forgetting 
is  binary . You either forget or you do not. There’s no middle ground, no 
partial forgetting, no milder or sharper forgetting. Then again, it could be 
that forgetting is  gradable . It admits of degrees or occurs to varying extents. 
As Daniel  Schacter (2001 : 33) puts it, there is “incomplete rather than total 
forgetting that leaves in its wake scattered shards of experience. Vague 
impressions of familiarity, general knowledge of what happened, or frag-
mentary details of experience.” When forgetting intensity is high enough, 
it is another circumstance in which we hear the subject described as “com-
pletely” forgetting. 
 3 Theories of Forgetting 
 A theory of forgetting fi lls in some dimensions of forgetting. A more com-
plete theory completes more dimensions. The peeps in the literature about 
forgetting’s nature express stances on some dimensions I’ve covered. Some 
philosophers and psychologists state in passing simple views about forget-
ting. It may be most charitable to understand these views as incomplete 
theories, stating just a necessary or suffi cient condition for forgetting. Even 
so, I will show that the simple views face immediate problems. Then I will 
go over more developed theories of forgetting. 
 One simple view is that you are forgetting whatever it is you aren’t 
recalling. That is: 
 Simple Access Failure Theory . If S does not recall  x , then S forgets  x . 4 
 The Simple Access Failure Theory classifi es forgetting as a state. You are 
in the state of forgetting anything that you aren’t recalling. But this is not 
quite right. At any given time, we aren’t recalling most things that we 
remember quite well. This is in part because we are making no attempt to 
recall any of this. But it would be incorrect to count us at any given time 
as forgetting most of what we remember! A moment ago, for example, you 
weren’t recalling what you did last night. You weren’t trying recall it. Still, 
we shouldn’t conclude that you were forgetting it. 
 There is a simple fi x. You aren’t forgetting just anything you aren’t recalling. 
Rather, you are forgetting only what you aren’t recalling  in a certain situation . 
What’s the situation? It could be free recall, a period where you try to recall 
select items (in no particular order, using any strategy). Given this fi x, we have: 
 Less Simple Access Failure Theory . If S does not recall  x during free 
recall targeting  x , then S forgets  x . 5 
AuQ3
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 This theory makes an improvement. It doesn’t imply that at any given time 
you are forgetting most of what you remember. This is because you aren’t 
in free recall at just any given time, and because when you are in free recall 
you aren’t trying to recall most of what you remember. Unfortunately, a 
problem remains. Suppose that right now, during free recall, I am trying 
to recall what it is you did last night. If I am unsuccessful, we should not 
conclude that I am forgetting what you did last night. This is because at 
no point have I had any idea what you did last night. I never  learned what 
you did. The Less Simple Access Failure Theory, however, oddly implies 
that I am forgetting what you did last night. What’s more, the Less Simple 
Access Failure Theory is far from complete, giving just a narrow suffi cient 
condition for forgetting. It doesn’t tell us anything about the forgetting that 
occurs outside of free recall. And, as we’ll see, forgetting outside of free 
recall is common. 
 If, during free recall, you do not recollect something that you learned 
and that you’re trying to recall, your memory in some sense fails. The fi nal 
simple view is that forgetting is just any sort of memory failure: 
Simple Memory Failure Theory . If S’s memory fails (with respect to  x ), 
then S forgets ( x ). 6 
 On the Simple Memory Failure Theory, forgetting looks once again 
like a state. It at least sometimes is a state of having memory failure 
with respect to something. Compared to the previous theory, this theory 
makes a step forward. On this theory, memory failures other than those 
occurring during free recall count as forgetting. However, this theory 
also makes a step backward. It avoids being too narrow about forgetting 
simply by being too broad. Memory can fail in a number of ways that 
don’t involve forgetting. It can fail by leaving us open to confabulating, 
adding incorrect details into what is recollected. It can fail by leading to 
various biases, or by continually activating unwelcome memories. 7 These 
memory failures are not automatically instances of forgetting. Of course, 
we could refi ne the idea behind the Simple Memory Failure Theory. Not 
just any memory failure is forgetting. Rather, forgetting is a special kind 
of memory failure. Just what kind is it? As we noted with the Less Simple 
Access Failure Theory, our focus should not be limited to failures dur-
ing free recall. Also, the relevant memory failure should exclude failures 
to access information one never learned. I don’t think there is a good, 
simple way to meet all the criteria here, so I won’t say more about the 
Simple Memory Failure Theory. 
 The simple theories proved to be too simple. I will introduce a pair of 
more sophisticated theories, and then test them together. The simple theo-
ries all identify forgetting as something that can be a state. The fi rst sophis-
ticated theory departs notably from this, however, focusing on forgetting as 
a process. Timothy Williamson (2000: 34) takes this to an extreme, saying, 
“Not all factive attitudes constitute states; forgetting is a process.” A factive 
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attitude is an attitude that guarantees the truth of its content.  Seeing that  p
is often thought to be factive. If you see that Brian has a mullet, Brian indeed 
has a mullet. Williamson thinks forgetting is factive—you can forget only 
truths, not falsehoods. For Williamson, it is critical that all forgetting is a 
process, never a state. He ( 2000 : 34) thinks “knowing is the most general 
factive stative attitude,” that is, anyone in a factive attitude state that  p 
knows that  p . (This, he thinks, is evidence that the concept of knowledge 
plays a central role in our thinking.) But at fi rst glance, it doesn’t look like 
your forgetting that  p guarantees your knowing that  p . On the contrary, 
forgetting seems to explain a loss of knowledge. So, if forgetting is factive, 
it had better turn out that forgetting isn’t a state. For if it is a factive state, 
knowledge isn’t the most general factive stative attitude, and we lose evi-
dence that the concept of knowledge is so special. 
 Williamson suggests, then: 
Process Theory . S forgets that  p only if and because S has a factive 
process attitude toward  p . 8 
 As formulated, the Process Theory says just this: forgetting  guarantees
there is some process involving an attitude toward a true proposition, and 
forgetting is explained by this process. It doesn’t say that forgetting  is the 
process attitude, nor that forgetting cannot be a state. So, the Process Theory 
is weaker than Williamson’s view. Also, friends of the Process Theory may 
offer a different account for nonpropositional (objectual and procedural) 
forgetting. None of this will matter for my evaluations of the Process Theory 
in the next section. At any rate, if the Process Theory is incorrect then 
Williamson’s view is incorrect, since Williamson’s view entails the Process 
Theory. And if the Process Theory is incorrect, there is less evidence that 
knowledge plays the special role that Williamson says it plays. I’ll return to 
this point in Section 6. 
 The other sophisticated, and most promising, theory of forgetting currently 
in the literature, understands propositional and objectual forgetting as a 
loss of information. The information is lost from long-term memory, which 
includes short-term memory but not working memory. This gives us: 
Information Loss Theory . S forgets  x only if and because S loses a 
record of  x from S’s long-term memory. 9 
 Understand  loses here broadly. Sometimes loss is the  elimination of a 
record from long-term memory—the information fades or gets deleted—
so the loss is all else being equal permanent. But more often it is an  inac-
cessibility of information despite appropriate stimuli. That is, even though 
the subject is presented with relevant retrieval cues, the record remains at 
least temporarily inaccessible. 10 On the Information Loss Theory, forget-
ting looks like a state, though it could also be a process involving this 
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state. The state is that of having dropped something from long-term mem-
ory, or of having something in long-term memory that cannot be retrieved. 
The Information Loss Theory skirts the snares that tripped the Less Simple 
Access Failure Theory—it theorizes about all propositional and objectual 
forgetting, and it makes forgetting require learning (because anything lost 
from long term memory was learned). And the Information Loss Theory 
does not confl ate just any memory failure with forgetting. So it beats, or 
perhaps simply develops, the Simple Memory Failure Theory. In fact it’s 
looking shipshape. 
 4 The Metacognition Test and Prospection Test 
 The Process Theory and Information Loss Theory fashion up forgetting in 
quite different ways. Still, they have similar fl aws. This section offers two 
tests for an adequate theory of forgetting. Each checks whether a theory 
can accommodate certain intuitive data about forgetting. It is bad to fail 
either test. Failure generates an argument against the theory. I claim that 
the Process Theory and Information Loss Theory fail each test, and so they 
are in trouble. They may face separate challenges as well, but for simplicity 
I consider just those they share. 
 First, there is the metacognition test. Not only do we cognitively process in-
formation, but we also monitor and control this processing. This is metacog-
nition. One thing we monitor, typically unconsciously, is our own production 
of information (from, for example, memory). This results in a metacognitive 
feeling, which gives phenomenological feedback about our cognitive process-
ing. Any of a broad range of metacognitive feelings may arise, depending 
on whether information is indeed produced, on the details of any produced 
information, and on how it is produced (e.g., quickly, slowly). One common 
metacognitive feeling is the feeling of forgetting. It can be a frustratingly un-
specifi c feeling. As you are about to leave your home for the airport, you feel 
you are forgetting . . .  something . You can’t tell what, despite trying. You are 
failing to retrieve some target information. This metacognitive feeling is not 
only common, but it is also generally accurate evidence of forgetting. 11 The 
feeling may sometimes arise when there is no relevant forgetting, but that 
is the exception. A theory of forgetting should not confl ict with any of this. 
What’s more, it should make sense of cases in which, intuitively, the feeling 
of forgetting is accurate; the theory should imply that they are indeed cases 
of forgetting. These are the standards of the metacognition test. 
 The Process Theory does not meet these standards. It could be that pro-
cesses altogether lack phenomenology, but that is not why the Process The-
ory fails the metacognition test. For even if no process is phenomenological, 
it could be that the process of forgetting involves a succession of states, and 
that one of these can be a phenomenological state like the feeling of forget-
ting. The Process Theory could then explain any accurate feeling of forget-
ting as occurring in connection with a state in the process of forgetting. 
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 No, the Process Theory fails the metacognition test elsewhere. Suppose 
forgetting can indeed be a process. The process is not in each case ongoing. 
It ends. And sometimes, afterward, a relevant feeling of forgetting arises. 
And sometimes, this feeling is accurate—there is in fact forgetting after the 
process of forgetting has fi nished. Take a simple example. I study a list of 
obscure words having to do with astrophysics. Much later, you ask me to re-
produce the list. I experience the feeling of forgetting. I am in fact forgetting 
what was on the list. So, my feeling is accurate. But the Process Theory does 
not make sense of this. The process of forgetting what was on the list began 
and ended some while ago. Once the process ends, that forgetting ends. The 
feeling of forgetting is a feeling having to do at least partly with how things 
currently stand; it is a feeling of current forgetting, not purely past. So on 
the Process Theory, any feeling of forgetting after the process of forgetting 
ends is inaccurate. According to it, I am not forgetting when having a feeling 
of forgetting upon trying and failing to recollect the astrophysics terms that 
I had learned. But that is wrong. 
 Despite its merits the Information Loss Theory stumbles on the 
metacognition test too. The Information Loss Theory explains forgetting 
in terms of lost target information. A feeling of forgetting will be accurate 
only if the target information either has been eliminated or is inaccessible 
when the feeling occurs. In many cases the target information really is lost, 
but not so in many others. These other cases are those where the target 
information has not been eliminated and remains  accessible in the face 
of relevant cues, but the information simply is not  accessed . Suppose you 
supply helpful retrieval cues, reminding me that the words on the studied list 
were on astrophysics, that some words start with this or that letter, and that 
others rhyme with these or those words. On this occasion I am unsuccessful 
in recollecting what was on the list, but I could succeed on another occasion. 
Yet I am indeed forgetting, and there is no inaccessibility or elimination of 
information here that explains this. 
 The problem is not just in the eyes of pedants; the difference between 
a failure to access and inaccessibility is not trivial. 12 I fail to access my 
destination if something halts me en route to it. But that is not to say my 
destination is inaccessible. If it were inaccessible, all my routes to it would 
be blocked, or I would not have the power to access it. Inaccessibility 
is a strong dispositional relation. Forgetting can result from a one-off 
disconnect, a nondispositional and weaker relation. Sometimes this weaker 
relation explains why a feeling of forgetting is accurate, even when the 
target information is accessible. That is why the Information Loss Theory 
doesn’t pass the metacognition test. 
 The second test, the prospection test, focuses on certain cases of prospec-
tive memory failure. Roughly, prospective memory is memory for intended 
future action. Some prospective memory failure counts as forgetting. 13 Sup-
pose I decide I will call you at noon, but when noon comes I am so preoc-
cupied that it never occurs to me to pick up my phone. I needn’t have a 
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feeling of forgetting at noon, nor any other relevant metacognitive feeling. 
I simply fail to perform my intended act when I am in the appropriate cir-
cumstance. The failure to recollect may result from a shortage of suitable re-
trieval cues—I didn’t set an alarm as a reminder—or from suitable retrieval 
cues being available yet ineffective—my alarm went off, but I didn’t recall 
what it was for. Regardless, it seems I am forgetting, as a direct result of 
some failure of prospective memory. Call this  prospective forgetting . 
 The Process Theory poorly explains prospective forgetting. Prospective 
forgetting can happen in particular circumstances or at specifi c times. At 
noon I forget to call you. I am not forgetting before or after noon. But 
processes take time. They occur over time, not at times. So the Process 
Theory requires that forgetting is temporally extended. It can describe me, 
at noon, as being somewhere in the process of forgetting, but it cannot 
describe my forgetting as entirely localized to noon. But it is natural to 
describe some prospective memory failure as occurring just at one time. This 
would be the time of the intended action. Since processes are temporally 
bloated, the Process Theory can’t explain all prospective memory failure. 
 The Information Loss Theory struggles on the prospection test for the 
same reason it struggled on the metacognition test. The theory explains 
forgetting in terms of eliminated or inaccessible information. Now, in 
prospective forgetting, an intended act is not performed at the chosen time 
or circumstance. Something or other is not accessed then. Suppose what 
is not accessed is the intention to act. This is not to say that anything is 
inaccessible or has been eliminated at the time of forgetting. The intention 
can remain accessible, but just not accessed. Better retrieval cues, or better 
luck with retrieval cues, could have led to access. I could have accessed my 
intention to call you, and would have accessed it if I had set my alarm, or if 
I recollected what it was for when it went off. The Information Loss Theory 
does not account for all prospective forgetting. 
 On a different theory of what  loss consists in, the Information Loss Theory 
could do better on the metacognition and prospection tests. The alternative 
theory counts not just elimination and inaccessibility as loss, but also access 
failure. Advocates of the Information Loss Theory do not yet count access 
failure as loss, but perhaps the metacognition and prospection tests will be 
their gadfl y. However, this alternative theory does not seem promising—
it seems to imply that there are losses where, intuitively, there aren’t any. 
Suppose you are playing a trivia game, and an answer to a trivia question 
is stuck “on the tip of your tongue.” You are failing to access it. This new 
theory apparently counts this answer as lost. This tip of the tongue state 
does seem like forgetting of a sort, but it needn’t involve loss. It is precisely 
because you have not lost the answer that it feels like it is on the tip of 
your tongue. Because you have not lost the answer, you can reasonably rule 
out many possible answers (“Let’s see, the fi fth U.S. president wasn’t James 
Madison . . .”), and why you can in some cases detect linguistic features 
(“But his name is very similar to ‘James Madison’ . . .”). The revised theory 
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of loss looks incorrect. Advocates of the Information Loss Theory gain little 
if they adopt it in order to pass the metacognition and prospection tests. 
 5 The LEAD Theory of Forgetting 
 No theory of forgetting in the literature is fully adequate. Each fails to account 
for some forgetting. I offer a new theory. It aims to be maximally general, 
leaving open as many dimensions of forgetting as possible. So, it aims to be 
a maximally unifi ed account of forgetting, showing what the various types 
of forgetting fundamentally have in common. Insofar as it meets this aim, 
it has an asset. (We’ll see it has other assets too.) Perhaps nothing unites 
the various forgetting phenomena beyond a family resemblance or even 
coincidence—English-speakers just happen to call some unrelated things 
“forgetting.” But if there is a sturdier connection, we should look for it. 
 I will build up the necessary and suffi cient conditions for forgetting one 
by one. To start: 
 S forgets  x to extent  e at  t iff . . . 
 Here,  x can be propositional, objectual, or procedural. So the theory is gen-
eral with respect to content type. It is not general with respect to ontological 
category, however. It indexes forgetting to a time  t , and so it is not about 
forgetting  over time—that is, not about the process of forgetting. For now 
I will say what just the state of forgetting is, and later will explain the pro-
cess in terms of the state. Finally, forgetting can be gradable on this theory. 
One forgets to an extent,  e . If forgetting can be gradable, it is a further and 
unanswered question just how many grades there are. The grades could 
be few (slight, moderate, strong) or many (extremely slight, very slight, 
slight. . .). But the theory is also compatible with some and even all forget-
ting being binary. When the magnitude range of forgetting is binary, then 
one forgets to the greatest extent if at all. Since the theory accounts for both 
binary and gradable forgetting, it is general in scale. 
 The fi rst necessary condition for forgetting is: 
 (1)  S has learned  x by  t , and. . . 
 You cannot forget what you never learned. According to (1), forgetting 
requires learning by the time of forgetting. Normal human learning results 
from experience and from memory processing information that originates in 
experience. Learning can also have unusual causes, such as brain-tampering 
or trauma. 14 At any rate, not all learning will be conscious. It is an open 
question whether we count as learning information that enters only working 
memory and not long-term memory, or information that is a part of experi-
ence but never attended to. 15 In short, (1) ensures that we forget only what 
we have gotten. 
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 The next necessary condition for forgetting is: 
 (2)  S fails to extent  e to internally access  x at  t , and. . . 
 At the time of forgetting, the subject fails to access internally whatever 
is being forgotten. If you are internally accessing something—that Plato 
taught Aristotle, your experience of your breakfast—you aren’t altogether 
forgetting it. Whatever you internally access, you  have , in a way that forget-
ting precludes. The  internally qualifi cation here is imprecise but important. 
Suppose I ask you what you were doing exactly one year ago. You try to 
recall, without success. I then pull up some footage of what you were doing. 
Merely by watching the footage, you are in a sense accessing what you were 
doing. 16 Still, you forget what you were doing, even as you watch. The kind 
of access forgetting cannot abide is strictly internal. For simplicity I leave 
‘internally’ implicit from here on. 
 Like forgetting, access failure appears to occur to greater and lesser 
extents. I can bring to mind just a few details of a past experience, or a host 
of details, or a smattering in between. According to (2), a subject forgets 
something only to the extent that she fails to access it. If she completely 
forgets, it must be that she completely fails to access. Accessibility is another 
matter, however. For all (2) states, something can be completely forgotten 
and yet accessible, even highly accessible. So we diverge here from the 
Information Loss Theory. 
 Conditions (1) and (2) say forgetting requires learning and access failure. 
Forgetting requires more, though. At any given time, I am failing to access 
most of what I have learned—even most of what I still know—but I am not 
forgetting all of this bulk. The fi nal element for forgetting is a dispositional 
relation to what is forgotten. But it turns out that either of two dispositional 
relations will do. The last necessary condition for forgetting, then, is 
disjunctive: 
 (3)  (a) at  t , S intends to internally access  x under some description by  t , or 
 (b)  x is internally inaccessible to S to extent  e at  t . 
 Forgetting involves either intending to internally access, or internal 
inaccessibility. I will explain these dispositional relations in turn. 
 According to (a), one last condition for forgetting can be intending to 
access. Together with the fi rst two conditions, this tells us that  forgetting 
can be failing to access something that was learned and is intended to be 
accessed . There is more than one way that a subject can be, at the time 
of forgetting, intending to access something by then. One obvious option: 
the subject is at the time of forgetting in fact  attempting to access what is 
forgotten. If, for example, I am trying to recollect your last name right now, 
I am thereby intending to access it right now. If my efforts are unsuccessful, 
and I have indeed learned your last name, then right now I am forgetting 
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it. Now, if I am forgetting your last name, I am failing to access it. So the 
content of my current attempt to recollect your last name cannot be directly 
identifying it (for example, as  Nieves )—direct identifi cation looks like 
access. Rather, the content of my recollective attempt identifi es it indirectly, 
by appropriately describing it (for example, as  Maria’s last name ). That 
is why (a) says the subject who forgets  x intends to access  x under some 
description . 
 We now have a good explanation of why the feeling of forgetting is ac-
curate, when accurate. While a subject has the feeling of forgetting and is 
indeed forgetting, she is attempting (perhaps involuntarily) to access some-
thing she had learned, satisfying (1). In virtue of attempting, she is intending 
to access what she had learned, satisfying (a). But she is unsuccessful, sat-
isfying (2). These three conditions jointly suffi ce for forgetting. Metacogni-
tion test: passed. 
 There is a second option for how a subject can be intending to access 
what she is at the time forgetting: the subject formed this intention in the 
past and has kept it. That is, the subject has a suitable intention stored or 
standing when forgetting. A closer look at prospective memory will help us 
make sense of this. 
 Prospective memory, again, is memory for intended future action. This 
morning I decide I will call you at noon. Something sustains this plan, allow-
ing me to follow through on it. That is prospective memory. Although we 
commonly talk as though a mere act is the content of prospective remember-
ing and forgetting, the content really is an intention. I don’t remember to 
call you, I remember my intention to call you. Now, since I don’t intend to 
call you just yet, for now I fi le away my intention to call you. I don’t want it 
fi led away forever. I want to retrieve it at the right time, noon. In fact, nor-
mally, I  intend to retrieve it at the right time—I have an intention to access 
my intention to act. To see this, note how it is possible yet unusual for me to 
intend a future act but not intend to access the intention to act. This might 
occur if, for example, I suspend or lose my intention to access my intention 
to call you, even while keeping the intention to call. To my relief, my wife 
tells me she’ll remind me to call you; I cease trying to remember to call you, 
though I still intend to call. Prospective memory commonly involves an in-
tention to retrieve an intention for future action. 
 I suggest that in prospective forgetting, the subject still intends to retrieve, 
but at the desired time fails to retrieve. 17 Suppose I haven’t outsourced the 
reminder task to my wife. I intend to access at noon my intention to call 
you. Noon comes, and I do not access the intention to call, but I still have 
the intention to access it. I am forgetting to call you. More exactly, I am 
forgetting my intention to call you. If, however, I have totally discharged 
the reminder task, I cannot be at noon forgetting my intention to call you. 
I no longer intend to access my intention to call, so I am not forgetting that 
intention. I can of course  not remember at noon to call you, but that is not 
the same as forgetting. 
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 Conditions (1), (2), and (a) are satisfi ed in any prospective forgetting case. 
At noon I fail to access my intention to call—fulfi lling (2)—yet at noon 
I intend to access the intention to call—fulfi lling (a). I formed my intention 
to call you by the time of forgetting it, and this acquisition of an intention 
is learning of a sort, a taking in. This fulfi lls (1). Prospection test: passed. 
 Now for (b), the second disjunct in condition (3). It places an internal 
inaccessibility condition on forgetting. Given (b) and conditions (1) and (2), 
we see forgetting can be something different from what accounts for the 
accurate feeling of forgetting and for prospective forgetting.  Forgetting can 
be failing to access something that was learned and is inaccessible . This 
explains cases where what is forgotten is something that has been eliminated 
from memory or rendered at least temporarily irretrievable. The forgetter 
needn’t have any metacognitive feeling or standing intention to access 
what is forgotten. With respect to your old locker combination you have 
no feeling of forgetting, nor any plan to retrieve it. Yet you forget it, and 
will continue to forget it, and have been forgetting it for some while. It’s 
inaccessible to you. 
 Inaccessibility can be partial. This is vague, but intuitive enough. If many 
details of a previously experienced event are now inaccessible, yet other details 
remain accessible, then the event itself is partially inaccessible. Condition (b) 
links the extent of forgetting with the extent of the inaccessibility of what is 
forgotten. Forgetting is greater or lesser as inaccessibility is greater or lesser. 
Of course, condition (2) links the extent of forgetting with something else—
the extent of the failure to access what is forgotten. This raises a question: 
if both (2) and (b) are satisfi ed, and the extents of the access failure and 
inaccessibility are unequal, to what extent does the subject forget? Is it to 
the extent of the access failure, or to the extent of the inaccessibility? 
 Answer: the lower of the two. The access failure and inaccessibility are 
each at least that high. Now, the inaccessibility will always be equal to or 
less than the access failure. That is, something will be at least as accessible as 
it is accessed. Sometimes what is forgotten is highly accessible while simply 
not accessed. What’s forgotten, though, is never highly accessed while 
inaccessible. So, since the extent of inaccessibility is the lower of the two 
when there is inequality, it determines the extent of forgetting. This way, 
you don’t count as forgetting your current and well-remembered locker 
combination when  not trying to retrieve it. When not trying to retrieve it, 
you are failing to a maximal extent to access it. Still, it is highly accessible 
to you—it is inaccessible to no extent—so you aren’t forgetting it to any 
extent. 
 There are no other conditions on forgetting. I propose, then, the  le arning, 
a ccess failure, and  d ispositional—for short, LEAD—theory of forgetting: 
LEAD Theory . S forgets  x to extent  e at  t iff 
 (1)  S has learned  x by  t , and 
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 (2)  S fails to extent  e to internally access  x at  t , and 
 (3)  (a) at  t , S intends to internally access  x under some description 
by  t , or 
  (b)  x is internally inaccessible to S to extent  e at  t . 
 The LEAD Theory says that a subject who forgets is failing to access some-
thing both learned and either inaccessible or intended to be accessed. I have 
been all too brief about what learning, internal access, and inaccessibility 
consist in. Those elements of the LEAD Theory deserve exclusive analysis 
on another day. It is enough work for now to establish just the structure of 
forgetting. 
 Even by its structure we can see the LEAD Theory has a number of 
virtues. Jointly, they are strong evidence for the theory. I have laid out two 
virtues already: the LEAD Theory passes both the metacognition test and the 
prospection test. What’s more, the LEAD Theory accounts for all forgetting 
that the Information Loss theory accounts for, where the target information 
is irretrievable. It is a further virtue of the LEAD Theory that it unites various 
kinds of forgetting. It shows for example what prospective forgetting has in 
common with the forgetting that comes with a metacognitive feeling. It is 
general with respect to content type, connecting propositional, objectual, 
and procedural forgetting. And so on. There are many species of forgetting, 
and the LEAD Theory picks out their genus. 
 Another virtue of the LEAD Theory is that it is not in jeopardy if human 
memory turns out to be generative. Empirical research suggests our memory 
is not a simple warehouse that shelves the items we deposit and later with-
draw. Instead, it looks like memory disassembles, discriminatingly discards, 
redesigns, and reassembles, even in cases where we end up withdrawing a 
fairly faithful representation of the past. 18 Memory constructs, not just a 
little, and not just when malfunctioning. This presents no problems for the 
LEAD Theory. If memory meddles with what we give it, it doesn’t follow on 
the LEAD Theory that we are forgetting, since the meddling needn’t affect 
accessibility. Accessing could be a generative process; accessibility could be 
a matter of generative power, and inaccessibility could result from genera-
tion troubles and not just storages troubles. 
 On the LEAD Theory, forgetting is compatible with a few things that 
might surprise us. This is a virtue of the theory because the compatibility 
is correct but hard to achieve. Forgetting is compatible with knowing, for 
example. Some ways of forgetting leave room for knowledge. Only certain 
ways preclude it. 19 Suppose in a trivia game, you are asked who the fi fth 
U.S. president was. You know it was James Monroe. But this knowledge 
remains dispositional, even after you are asked—it is standing, not before 
your mind. You have a feeling of forgetting, and are trying but failing 
to access this information you learned. So, you are forgetting something 
you simultaneously know, namely, that James Monroe was the fi fth U.S. 
president. While having this feeling of forgetting, you might even have a 
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second metacognitive feeling about the same information—the feeling of 
knowing! Sometimes both feelings are accurate. 
 Similarly, on the LEAD Theory, forgetting is compatible with remember-
ing. When a subject is forgetting  x because she is trying but failing to access 
x , she can on many theories still be remembering  x . 20 To be remembering 
and forgetting the same thing at once is not rare. I am forgetting your last 
name. Nonetheless I am confi dent I still remember it, and so I continue to 
try to retrieve it. Eventually I successfully retrieve it, and this is because 
I remembered it all along. The remembering had just been dispositional or 
standing. 
 In light of its virtues, I conclude that the LEAD Theory is the one to beat. 
 6 Process Forgetting 
 The LEAD Theory does not, however, tell the full story of forgetting. It 
accounts for forgetting with a variety of content types, relations to content, 
and scales. But it is just a theory of  stative forgetting , forgetting as a state. It 
is not, in other words, general with respect to ontological category. A fi nal 
chapter in the full story of forgetting says what the  process of forgetting is, 
and says what relation the process bears to the state. 
 I’ll sketch a reductionist theory of the process of forgetting (or  process 
forgetting ). It takes a simple view of what a process in general is: a sequence 
of states. If a process of any kind is just a sequence of states, then the process 
of forgetting is just a sequence of states. This suggests a formula: build 
up a view of process forgetting by identifying its constitutive states and 
their relation. I propose that the constitutive states are states of forgetting, 
and that their relation is one of increasing strength. That is,  the process 
of forgetting is that of going from a state of lesser forgetting to a state of 
greater forgetting . More formally: 
Reductionist Process Theory . S is in the process of forgetting  x from 
t to  t + n iff for every pair of sequential times  t m and  t m +1 in the interval 
from  t to  t+n , 
 (1)  S forgets  x to extent  e 1 at  t m , 
 (2)  S forgets  x to extent  e 2 at  t m +1 , and 
 (3)  e 1 <  e 2 . 
 Since a process is a sequence of states on this theory, a process is extended 
through time. So, the left-hand side indexes the process of forgetting to 
spans of time. Whatever the potential extents of forgetting are, they increase 
over every time during the process of forgetting. This respects our intuitive 
judgments about process forgetting. When it seems someone is in the pro-
cess of forgetting, it seems the subject ends up in a greater state of forgetting 
than before. If the extent of forgetting seems fi xed over a stretch of time, the 
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subject does not seem to be in the process of forgetting during it. The subject 
could, however, be in a persisting  state of forgetting over those times. 
 This points the spotlight at a potential ambiguity in our forgetting-
attributions. That someone is forgetting over time underdetermines whether 
the person is in a persisting state of forgetting, or is instead in the process of 
forgetting. On the LEAD Theory, someone could count as being in the state 
of forgetting over a long stretch of time—the subject could continue to for-
get something long forgotten. This seems odd if taken to suggest that as time 
passes the subject is repeating a process of forgetting, or is forgetting more 
severely something already completely forgotten. But a continuing state of 
forgetting does not suffi ce for a continuing process of forgetting. Continu-
ously forgetting can be like continuously knowing, rather than continuously 
coming to know. There are two ways to keep forgetting. 
 The Reductionist Process Theory does not follow from the LEAD Theory. 
It is compatible with any gradable theory of stative forgetting. It is an alter-
native to Williamson’s strong process theory, which denies that there is any 
stative forgetting. If the Reductionist Process Theory is correct, then Wil-
liamson’s strong process theory is incorrect, and several of his other claims 
from Section 3 teeter. On the Reductionist Process Theory, since there are 
processes of forgetting, there are states of forgetting. But if we grant Wil-
liamson that forgetting is factive, then the state of forgetting is a factive 
stative attitude that does not require knowledge. So, contra Williamson, 
knowledge is not the  most general factive stative attitude. As a result, there 
is less evidence for Williamson’s claim that the concept of knowledge is 
central in our thinking. 
 7 Conclusion 
 I have surveyed many dimensions of forgetting and challenged the few theo-
ries about it on offer. I have put forth a unifi ed theory of the state of forget-
ting, and a theory of the process of forgetting, making the relation between 
the process and state clear. Together, my two main proposals remember all 
forgetting. 21 
 Notes 
 1  See especially Conee and Feldman (2011, p. 304). For discussion, see Frise 
(2015; 2017a). 
 2  A view commonly attributed to John Locke. Behan (1979) reads him differently. 
 3  Cf. Michaelian (2011, p. 402) and Tulving (1983, p. 47). 
 4  Halamish et al. (2011, 632) and Tulving and Pearlstone (1966, 389). 
 5  Friedman and Castel (2011). 
 6  Bernecker (2010, p. 198). 
 7  See Schacter (2001). 
 8  Cf. Koriat et al. (2004, p. 651). 
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 9  Harris et al. (2010, p. 255) and Michaelian (2011, pp. 402–4). Cf. Roediger 
et al. (2010, p. 2) and Tulving (1974, p. 74). 
 10  See Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) and Michaelian (2011, p. 403–7). I note that 
elimination guarantees inaccessibility—what you no longer have, you cannot 
access. So, the  loss relations appear to be just varieties of inaccessibility. 
 11  Cf. Arango-Muñoz (2013) and Halamish et al. (2011). See also Arango-Muñoz 
and Michaelian (2014) and Michaelian (2016). 
 12  Mere access failure explains the mere retrieval failure of information, which 
seems to have special epistemological signifi cance. See Frise (2017b, section 4). 
 13  Cf. Annis (1980, p. 330) and Schacter (2001, pp. 51–60). 
 14  Cf. Conee and Feldman (2011, p. 305). 
 15  Schacter (2001, p. 27) thinks we forget even information that was only in work-
ing memory. Michaelian (2011, p. 402) disagrees. Presumably Schacter would 
say that information was learned, and Michaelian would not. 
 16  Cf. Martin and Deutscher (1966, pp. 182–3) on prompting. 
 17  McDaniel and Einstein (2007, p. 239) argue that the “retrieval of the prospec-
tive memory intention can occur even when the intention to retrieve has been 
suspended.” That is, prospective  remembering can be spontaneous, not requir-
ing an intention to retrieve the intention to act. This is orthogonal to my claim 
that prospective  forgetting requires an intention to retrieve. 
 18  See Frise (2018) and Michaelian (2016). 
 19  Cf. Moon (2012, p. 356). 
 20  This is so on the simulation theory and various causal theories of remembering 
(Michaelian, 2016, Chs. 5–6). Incidentally, Bernecker (2008, p. 27) says “the 
notion of forgetting can be adequately defi ned only by way of appeal to the 
notion of remembering.” I see it as a further bonus that the LEAD Theory makes 
no such appeal. 
 21  I thank David James Barnett, Earl Conee, Dorothea Debus, Christoph Hoerl, 
Corey Maley, Kevin McCain, Kourken Michaelian, Andrew Moon, Denis Per-
rin, Sarah Robins, two anonymous referees, and an audience at the 2016 Mem-
ory and Subjectivity Conference for helpful discussion of a draft of this paper. 
I wrote this while supported by a grant from the Templeton Religion Trust. The 
views expressed here may not refl ect those of the Templeton Religion Trust. 
 References 
 Annis, D. B. (1980). Memory and justifi cation.  Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research ,  40 (3), 324–333. 
 Arango-Muñoz, S. (2013). Scaffolded memory and metacognitive feelings.  Review 
of Philosophy and Psychology ,  4 (1), 135–152. 
 Arango-Muñoz, S., & Michaelian, K. (2014). Epistemic feelings, epistemic emo-
tions: Review and introduction to the focus section.  Philosophical Inquiries ,  2 (1), 
97–122. 
 Behan, D. P. (1979). Locke on persons and personal identity.  Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy ,  9 (1), 53–75. 
 Bernecker, S. (2008).  The metaphysics of memory . New York: Springer. 
 Bernecker, S. (2010).  Memory: A philosophical study . Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2011). Replies. In T. Dougherty (Ed.),  Evidentialism and 
its discontents . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   239 08-02-2018   23:20:03
240 Matthew Frise
 Friedman, M. C., & Castel, A. D. (2011). Are we aware of our ability to forget? 
Metacognitive predictions of directed forgetting.  Memory & Cognition ,  39 (8), 
1448–1456. 
 Frise, M. (2015). Epistemology of memory. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (Eds.),  Internet 
encyclopedia of philosophy . Retrieved from  www.iep.utm.edu/epis-mem/ 
 Frise, M. (2017a). Internalism and the problem of stored beliefs.  Erkenntnis ,  82 (2), 
285–304. 
 Frise, M. (2017b). Preservationism in the epistemology of memory.  The Philosophical 
Quarterly ,  67 (268), 486–507. 
 Frise, M. (2018). Eliminating the problem of stored beliefs.  American Philosophical 
Quarterly ,  55 (1), 63–79. 
 Halamish, V., McGillivray, S., & Castel, A. D. (2011). Monitoring one’s own 
forgetting in younger and older adults.  Psychology and Aging ,  26 (3), 631–635. 
 Harris, C. B., J. Sutton, & A. Barnier. (2010). Autobiographical forgetting, social 
forgetting and situated forgetting. In S. D. Sala (Ed.),  Forgetting (pp. 253–284). 
London: Psychology Press. 
 Koriat, A., Bjork, R. A., Sheffer, L., & Bar, S. K. (2004). Predicting one’s own 
forgetting: The role of experience-based and theory-based processes.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General ,  133 (4), 643–656. 
 Martin, C. B., & Deutscher, M. (1966, April). Remembering.  Philosophical 
Review ,  75 , 161–196. 
 McDaniel, M. A., & Einstein, G. O. (2007). Spontaneous retrieval in prospective 
memory. In J. S. Nairne (Ed.),  The foundations of remembering: Essays in honor 
of Henry L. Roediger ,  III . New York: Psychology Press. 
 McGrath, M. (2007). Memory and epistemic conservatism.  Synthese ,  157 (1), 1–24. 
 Michaelian, K. (2011). The epistemology of forgetting.  Erkenntnis ,  74 (3), 399–424. 
 Michaelian, K. (2016).  Mental time travel: Episodic memory and our knowledge of 
the personal past . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 Moon, A. (2012). Three forms of internalism and the new evil demon problem. 
 Episteme ,  9 (4), 345–360. 
 Naylor, A. (2015). Justifi cation and forgetting.  Pacifi c Philosophical Quarterly , 
 96 (3), 372–391. 
 Pappas, G. S. (1987). Suddenly he knows. In S. Luper (Ed.),  The possibility of 
knowledge: Nozick and his critics . Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefi eld. 
 Roediger III, Henry L., Weinstein, Y., & Agarwal, P. K. (2010). Forgetting: 
preliminary considerations. In S. D. Sala (Ed.),  Forgetting (pp. 1–22). New York: 
Psychology Press. 
 Schacter, D. L. (2001).  The seven sins of memory: How the mind forgets and 
remembers . Boston: Mariner Books. 
 Tulving, E. (1974). Cue-dependent forgetting.  American Scientist ,  62 (1), 74–82. 
 Tulving, E. (1983).  Elements of episodic memory . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Tulving, E., & Pearlstone, Z. (1966). Availability versus accessibility of informa-
tion in memory for words.  Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior ,  5 (4), 
381–391. 
 Williamson, T. (2000).  Knowledge and its limits . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   240 08-02-2018   23:20:04
